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ABSTRACT
Objectives: The assignment of prices or costs to pharmaceuticals can be
crucial to results and conclusions that are derived from pharmacoeco-
nomic cost effectiveness analyses (CEAs). Although numerous pharmaco-
economic practice guidelines are available in the literature and have been
promulgated in many countries, these guidelines are either vague or silent
about how drug costs should be established or measured. This is particu-
larly problematic in pharmacoeconomic studies performed from the “soci-
etal” perspective, because typically the measured cost of a brand name
pharmaceutical is not a true economic cost but also includes transfer
payments from some members of society (patients and third party payers)
to other members of society (pharmaceutical manufacturer stockholders)
in large part as a reward for biomedical innovation. Moreover, there are
numerous and complex institutional factors that inﬂuence how drug costs
should be measured from other CEA perspectives, both internationally
and within the domestic US context. The objective of this report is to
provide guidance and recommendations on how drug costs should be
measured for CEAs performed from a number of key analytic perspectives.
Methods: ISPOR Task Force on Good Research Practices—Use of Drug
Costs for Cost Effectiveness Analysis (Drug Cost Task Force [DCTF]) was
appointed with the advice and consent of the ISPOR Board of Directors.
Members were experienced developers or users of CEA models, worked in
academia, industry, and as advisors to governments, and came from
several countries. Because how drug costs should be measured for CEAs
depend on the perspectives, ﬁve Task Force subgroups were created to
develop drug cost standards from the societal, managed care, US govern-
ment, industry, and international perspective. The ISPOR Task Force on
Good Research Practices—Use of Drug Costs for Cost Effectiveness
Analysis (DCTF) subgroups met to develop core assumptions and an
outline before preparing six draft reports. They solicited comments on the
outline and drafts from a core group of 174 external reviewers and more
broadly from the membership of ISPOR at two ISPOR meetings and via
the ISPOR web site.
Results: Drug cost measurements should be fully transparent and reﬂect
the net payment most relevant to the user’s perspective. The Task Force
recommends that for CEAs of brand name drugs performed from a soci-
etal perspective, either 1) CEA analysts use a cost that more accurately
reﬂects true societal drug costs (e.g., 20–60% of average sales price), or
when that is too unrealistic to be meaningful for decision-makers, 2) refer
to their analyses as from a “limited societal perspective.” CEAs performed
from a payer perspective should use drug prices actually paid by the
relevant payer net of all rebates, copays, or other adjustments. When such
price adjustments are conﬁdential, the analyst should apply a typical or
average discount that preserves this conﬁdentiality.
Conclusions: Drug transaction prices not only ration current use of medi-
cation but also ration future biomedical research and development. CEA
researchers should tailor the appropriate measure of drug costs to the
analytic perspective, maintain clarity and transparency on drug cost mea-
surement, and report the sensitivity of CEA results to reasonable drug cost
measurement alternatives.
Keywords: cost effectiveness analysis, drug costs, drug research and devel-
opment, health-care market segmentation, health-care reimbursement,
payer perspective.
Background to theTask Force
The ISPOR Task Force on Good Research Practices—Use of Drug
Costs for Cost Effectiveness Analysis (DCTF) was recommended
by the ISPOR Health Science Policy Council on December 13,
2004 and approved by the ISPOR Board of Directors on May 15,
2005. Joel Hay and Jim Smeeding were appointed as Task Force
leaders by the ISPOR Board. The core members of the Task Force
who became the leaders of the Task Force subgroups were chosen
based on the key cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) modeling
perspectives and their experience as developers or users of CEA
models for that particular perspective. These individuals were
recognized as scientiﬁc leaders in the ﬁeld, who worked with that
perspective in academia, industry, and as advisors to governments,
andwho came from a variety of countries and health-care settings.
Because how drug costs should be measured for CEAs depend on
the perspectives, ﬁve Task Force subgroups were created to
develop drug cost standards from the societal, managed care, US
government, industry, and international perspective. Therefore,
this Task Force Report is given in six parts. Part I: issues and
recommendations; Part II: a societal perspective; Part III: a
managed care perspective; Part IV: US government perspective;
Part V: industry perspective; and Part VI: international perspec-
tive. The Task Force Report reﬂects the authors’ own experiences
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developing drug costs for use in CEAmodels and publications, but
is not intended as a comprehensive review of the literature.
The Task Force held its ﬁrst meeting at the ISPOR 10th
Annual International Meeting in Washington DC in 2005 and
held open forums and/or group leader breakfast meetings at the
ISPOR 8th Annual European Congress in Florence in 2005, at
the ISPOR 11th Annual International Meeting in Philadelphia in
2006, and at the 14th Annual International Meeting in Orlando
in 2009. The Task Force reviewed other ISPOR guidance docu-
ments that were developed to inform good scientiﬁc conduct
[1–3]. The Task Force subgroups held teleconferences and used
electronic mail to exchange outlines and ideas during the subse-
quent months. The ISPOR Task Force on Good Research
Practices—Use of Drug Costs for Cost Effectiveness Analysis
(DCTF) subgroups met to develop core assumptions and an
outline before preparing draft subgroup reports. Several telecon-
ferences of the Task Force subgroup leaders were held to discuss
the draft reports, incorporate feedback, and make revisions. Each
part of the Task Force Report was prepared by Task Force
subgroup cochairs and members and circulated to 174 Task
Force primary reviewers (who were self-identiﬁed from a broad
range of perspectives). After this review, new drafts was prepared
by the Task Force subgroups and made accessible for broader
review by all ISPOR members. Comments for these reports by
Task Force primary reviewers and ISPOR membership are pub-
lished at the ISPOR website. All opinions reﬂect those of the
authors and not necessarily their afﬁliations.
Introduction
The primary purpose of economic evaluation (speciﬁcally, CEA
as recommended in numerous international payer guidelines [4])
in health care is to provide valid and reliable information to
health-care policymakers and decision-makers regarding the rela-
tive value of alternative health-care interventions. The key ratio-
nale supporting these economic evaluations is that the market for
health-care interventions is so severely distorted by insurance
coverage, third-party payments, information failure, taxes, sub-
sidies, and numerous competition barriers that prices do not
serve the normal economic function of guiding efﬁcient resource
allocation. Unlike a competitive market, in health care, Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand” of price signals is so severely withered
and atrophied that it must be replaced by the virtual reality glove
of the economic analyst to ensure that scare resources are allo-
cated appropriately [5].
Although there are many areas of health care where prices are
distorted, perhaps no area is subject to more complexity, confu-
sion, imprecision, misunderstanding, or conﬂicting methods than
that of what price measurements to use for the cost of pharma-
ceuticals in economic evaluations [6]. The fundamental reason
for this is that pharmaceuticals are launched into the market only
after lengthy governmental review of safety and efﬁcacy (e.g., the
US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines
Agency). Prescription drugs are only sold by licensed medical
professionals under strict regulations regarding allowable usage
indications, patient populations, and appropriate marketing.
Pharmaceutical research, development, and innovation are
rewarded and encouraged primarily through patents, giving the
innovative manufacturer (the patent holder) a time-limited
monopoly over drug pricing for the patented drug. Because
patents reward innovation by transferring brand-speciﬁc
monopoly proﬁts (the excess of drug price over drug marginal
cost) from consumers to innovator pharmaceutical producers,
they distort competitive drug prices with the speciﬁc intent of
encouraging future drug R&D. Without patent protection, drug
companies would quickly discontinue pharmaceutical R&D. But
patent protection creates clear political, economic and social
tensions, because certain drugs could be provided to some
patients and/or payers at a price that would cover the marginal
costs of production, but are not high enough to generate optimal
proﬁts to the innovative manufacturer. As has been the case of
AIDS drugs in Africa, patients get sick and die without access to
existing medications partly to protect the patent monopoly
reward system to ensure pharmaceutical innovation for future
generations.
It is often in the interest of both the pharmaceutical manu-
facturer and its consumers to allow price discrimination among
different market segments. That is, the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer, particularly when holding patents on brand name drugs,
can often make more proﬁts and also make their products more
accessible to more market segments by charging different prices
to different consumers, based on the consumers’ different
demand elasticities (willingness-to-pay). This strategy is most
effective when such price discrimination is conﬁdential or parallel
imports are restricted, because this minimizes the potential for
supply leakage between market segments.
Drug price discrimination is most obvious in comparing
prices for the same brand name pharmaceuticals in different
countries (e.g., the price of a hypertension drug in Canada, the
United States, Mexico, and China). Although many health-care
providers can price discriminate across market segments, this
strategy is often challenged politically, because consumers in the
richer (higher priced) market segments usually resent having to
pay more for the same pills as consumers in the poorer (lower
priced) market segments. Unlike hospital or physician services,
pharmaceuticals are generally available as tangible and tradable
products, and when drug price discrepancies become too large
between different market segments (or countries) there will be
substantial arbitrage through legal, illegal, or grey market
re-importation activities.
Measurement of drug costs depends ﬁrstly on the perspective
of the analyst. Depending on the country or region, the drug cost
burden is ultimately shared in varying degrees between govern-
ment or other third party payers and patients. There are drug
supply chain intermediaries (e.g., wholesalers, retailers, etc.) who
receive payments for maintaining inventories, product distribu-
tion, and dispensing. There can also be demand-side intermedi-
aries (e.g., pharmaceutical beneﬁts managers, group purchasing
organizations, etc.) who receive payments for negotiating price
discounts or rebates and managing drug product lists and for-
mularies. At each step of these demand and supply chains, drug
acquisition costs may vary in complex and nontransparent ways.
Given this background, drug valuation (costing) for economic
evaluation is complicated. The complexity is compounded when
one considers that each economic evaluation is carried out from
a speciﬁc perspective (e.g., hospital, government payer [in a large
or small country], managed care organization, patient, societal,
etc.) and the various perspectives reﬂect tangibly different objec-
tives, impacts, allocation priorities, market power, and demand
elasticities. At the societal perspective level, particularly in coun-
tries with large domestic innovative pharmaceutical industry,
there is a clear tension between encouraging pharmaceutical
innovation with brand name drug prices that are substantially
higher than marginal drug production costs and encouraging
less-expensive medications to reduce health-care costs.
For managed care organizations, or for smaller countries
without domestic innovative pharmaceutical industries, there is
little direct incentive to encourage pharmaceutical innovation,
because such innovation disproportionately beneﬁts other con-
sumers, payers, or countries. In these organizations, it is prefer-
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able to take maximum advantage of one’s local monopsony
market power to drive drug prices as low as possible for both
payment and evaluation purposes. Because such organizations or
countries cannot impact R&D innovation substantially, it is in
their interest to “free-ride” on larger payers and countries whose
drug payments do have a signiﬁcant impact on drug manufac-
turer proﬁts and R&D incentives.
Frank Ramsey showed in 1927 that a monopolist facing
segmented markets (e.g., consumers with high income/high insur-
ance coverage vs. low income/low insurance coverage) would
achieve both higher proﬁts and higher social welfare by setting
prices in each market segment inversely proportional to the
market segment elasticity of demand [7,8]. It is beneﬁcial to both
pharmaceutical producers and many consumers to engage in
market segmentation; but because it is difﬁcult to prevent leakage
from lower-priced markets to higher-priced markets, the phar-
maceutical industry engages in extraordinarily complex and
often secretive negotiations with different customers with the
explicit purpose of preventing richer market segments from
knowing the actual transaction prices in the more demand-elastic
market segments.
For example, in the United States, the Medicaid program is
required by law to receive the lowest manufacturer price avail-
able to private and certain public purchasers for single source
drugs. Nevertheless, this transaction price is fully disguised
through secret volume rebates paid from the pharmaceutical
manufacturers to the state Medicaid programs. Thus, even
though they are all directly involved in the purchase and sales of
Medicaid drugs, Medicaid patients, retail pharmacists, drug
wholesalers, and other intermediaries have no idea what the real
transaction prices are for the Medicaid drug purchases.
Similar secretive price discounting mechanisms, often trig-
gered by volume targets, formulary placement and multidrug
purchasing from the same manufacturers, as well as rebates for
formulary placement, make it extremely difﬁcult to know what
any given government or third-party payer actually pays for
speciﬁc pharmaceutical products. Moreover, there is no require-
ment to make such information publicly known. Generally
speaking, those organizations with the greatest market power
(e.g., single-payer government health-care systems) and those
with the highest demand elasticity will capture greater discounts
from publicly quoted or published prices, while those with the
least market power and lowest demand elasticity will achieve
smaller discounts and pay close to full price.
It should be kept in mind that the traditional method for
rewarding pharmaceutical R&D through patent protection and
monopoly prices for new drugs is the result of historical prece-
dent and institutional inertia. It is an imperfect system for
rewarding biomedical innovation; often allocating scarce
resources towards “me-too” patentable new molecules rather
than towards genuine innovations, although leaving critically
important innovations (e.g., low-dose aspirin for heart disease or
generic antibiotics for ulcers) to languish for years without being
widely researched or adopted due to inability to obtain patent
protection and to proﬁt from valuable innovations [9].
Moreover, it is vitally important to provide adequate incen-
tives for biomedical research in general and pharmaceutical
R&D in particular. There is consensus among health economists
that the societal returns to biomedical R&D are on the order of
10–100 to 1 [10,11]. Cutler et al. have recently estimated that
within the US population, average life year gains from 1987 to
2000 were approximately 1 to 2 years and the average quality-
adjusted life year (QALY) gains were 3 to 4 years [12]. Valuing
these QALY gains at a societal willingness to pay of $150,000,
and assuming that 2 in 3 of these gains are due to medical care
improvements, mostly due to biomedical innovations [13],
implies that medical care gains added $90 trillion, or approxi-
mately $2.7 trillion annually to the societal wealth of the US
population during this time period. The global value of biomedi-
cal innovation would be several times larger than these estimates.
Several alternatives to the patent system have been proposed
to reward biomedical R&D [6–8,14]. These include user licenses,
government patent buyouts, rewards or tax-funded pharmaceu-
tical R&D. Whether such alternative mechanisms can be imple-
mented to incentivize pharmaceutical R&D without requiring a
monopoly pricing structure for brand name pharmaceuticals, it
would be feasible to use marginal cost (or generic) drug prices in
economic evaluations of pharmaceutical interventions, particu-
larly when done from a societal perspective. In fact, given that
the monopoly proﬁts awarded to drug manufacturer patent-
holders is not a true cost, but rather a transfer payment from one
member of society to another [15], there is a strong argument to
exclude these proﬁts from drug costs when conducting economic
evaluations from a societal perspective.
In fact, one can demonstrate that government buy-outs of
drug patents with all drugs being sold at generic pricing levels
could achieve a much better outcome for government programs,
private consumers, and third party payers without damaging the
incentives for pharmaceutical R&D. Currently, the brand name
pharmaceutical spending on R&D is about $60 billion [16]. US
federal drug spending is $81 billion [17]. Each year, the US
federal government could buy out all drug patents (by fully
subsidizing the private costs of pharmaceutical R&D) and still
save money because it would be able to purchase all drugs at
generic prices. US consumers would additionally beneﬁt by more
than $100 billion per year if all drugs were generic.
Beyond these theoretical concerns, there are institutional
complexities and opaque payment structures in every country
and health-care ﬁnancing system that make drug cost measure-
ment difﬁcult even when the analytic perspective is straight-
forward and clear. For example, in the US managed care
environment, a particular medication could experience a dozen
or more different transaction prices depending on where it is in
the supply chain from manufacturer, to wholesaler, to retailer, to
patient, and where it is in the payment/reimbursement chain
from manufacturer to managed care organization, to pharma-
ceutical beneﬁts manager, to patient, to rebate coupon. Although
this report is not an exhaustive compilation of all of the com-
plexities and variations in drug transaction costs, it does give
examples from many of the typical scenarios that CEA analysts
will encounter around the globe. More importantly, it provides
guidance and recommendations based on the authors’ and
reviewers’ experience and understanding of what works best.
Purposes of the Report
The purposes of this Task Force Report are: 1) to develop a
coherent set of guidelines for those developing or reviewing drug
cost measurements in CEAs; and 2) to develop a format for good
research practices in drug cost measurement that is useful for
decision-makers from various perspectives. The intended audi-
ence is research analysts who perform CEA analyses for health-
care decision-makers as well as health-care decision-makers who
are responsible for local or national formularies. Others who
may ﬁnd this document useful include members of the press,
patient advocacy groups, health-care professionals, drug and
other technology manufacturers, and those developing guidelines
for their settings. The panel recognizes that the methods for
measuring and reporting drug costs continue to develop. This
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report highlights areas of consensus as well as areas where con-
tinued methodological development is needed.
The Good Research Practices for Measuring Drug Costs in
Cost Effectiveness Analyses Report is published in six parts based
on analytic perspective. The next ﬁve articles in this issue of
Value in Health report the issues and recommendations for phar-
maceutical pricing from the different perspectives, including: 1)
Societal [18]; 2) Managed care [19]; 3) Medicare, Medicaid, and
other US Government Payers [20]; 4) Industry [21]; 5) European
countries and other international country perspectives [22].
These perspective-speciﬁc analyses are presented to provide guid-
ance and recommendations on how to obtain and use appro-
priate drug cost measurements when conducting economic
evaluations of health-care interventions for different health-care
decision-maker audiences.
We recognize that this initial task force report is over-
represented by topics relating to US payment and reimbursement
issues. This happened despite strong efforts by the task force to
recruit ISPOR members from all countries and regions and is not
meant to give offense to anyone. The task force members serve as
volunteers, and because of a large number of drug payment
policy issues coming forward in the US context recently, there
were more people motivated to address these topics. We certainly
hope and expect that this is just the ﬁrst chapter of an ongoing
effort to assess drug cost evaluation issues globally and that
future reports of the DCTF will be comprehensively representa-
tive of global drug evaluation concerns, whether they be different
countries, regions, stakeholder perspectives, methodological
approaches, or other issues. We certainly encourage any reader
who sees gaps that need to be addressed to join the DCTF and
add their perspective in future reports.
General Recommendations
Although most of the Task Force’s recommendations are speciﬁc
to each of the analytic perspectives that we focused on, there are
some general recommendations that we believe apply to drug
cost measurement in any cost effectiveness analysis setting or
application.
1. More clariﬁcation of the “societal perspective” is needed.
For CEAs of brand name drugs performed from a societal
perspective, either CEA analysts: i) use a cost that more
accurately reﬂects true societal drug costs (e.g., 20–60% of
average sales price), or whether that is unrealistic and not
meaningful for decision-makers; or ii) refer to their analyses
as conducted from a “limited societal perspective.”
2. Drug cost values and measurements should be transparent
and made available to any reader or user of a CEA, with the
data sources and rationale fully documented.
3. One-way and/or threshold CEA sensitivity analyses should
demonstrate how much higher/lower drug costs would have
to be to alter pharmacoeconomic model conclusions.
4. CEAs performed from a payer perspective should use drug
prices actually paid by the relevant payer net of all rebates,
copays, or other adjustments. When such price adjustments
are conﬁdential, the analyst should apply a generic average
discount that preserves this conﬁdentiality. As a corollary of
this, when done from a government perspective, drug costs
should be net of any sales tax, value-added tax, or other
taxes that are direct revenue offsets to the payer. Program
eligibility and coverage issues should be clearly stated or
referenced.
5. For drugs that are off-patent or likely to be off-patent in the
near future, it is appropriate to consider multisource drug
prices in either the base case or sensitivity analyses of phar-
macoeconomic models. It is also appropriate to include
longer-term trends in applicable drug prices (net of general
inﬂation) for chronic disease medications.
6. ISPOR should publish a website where current DCTF rec-
ommendations for drug costing are updated as important
new information becomes available.
7. Population-based estimates of drug costs should incorpo-
rate predicted adherence and persistence with drug therapy.
8. When done from a patient/consumer perspective, the total
net out-of-pocket payments for medications should be used
as the drug cost measurement. Implications of extreme
changes in marginal or average drug costs on patient drug
utilization (e.g., completion of deductible expense limits,
reaching maximum coverage beneﬁts, Medicare-type cover-
age “doughnut holes,” etc.) should be fully evaluated and
explained.
9. For international comparisons, drug units should be stan-
dardized in terms of volume/weight of active ingredient,
regardless of package and dosing frequency or strength
variations across countries.
10. Drug costs should be measured in local currency per unit of
active ingredient and should be converted to other curren-
cies using Purchasing Power Parity indexes or a currency
exchange rate relevant to the decision-maker.
11. When using drug prices from different years, the consumer
price index (preferably the medical care component price
index or the pharmaceutical component price index) for the
local currency should be applied before the currency
conversion.
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